IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

SUSANN BECKER,

Plaintiff,

8:23CV293

VS.

SCOTTSBLUFF COUNTY SHERIFF,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's pro se Complaint, Filing No. 1. Plaintiff, a non-prisoner proceeding pro se, has been given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Filing No. 15. Also before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Filing No. 16, and Motion captioned as a "Request for Transfer Admissions," Filing No. 17. The Court is required to conduct an initial review of in forma pauperis complaints pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

I. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Susanne Becker brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the caption names the "Scottsbluff County Sheriff" as the defendant, the Complaint itself names the State of Nebraska and the allegations appear to be against Deputy Sheriff Dominick Peterson. See Filing No. 1 at 2, 5. Construed liberally, Plaintiff alleges that on July 5, 2023, a person attempted to remove a car from Plaintiff's property. Filing No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff called law enforcement and Peterson arrived with another officer. Filing No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff told Peterson that she "was crazy, off [her] medication and manic" but Peterson refused to call for medical backup or an ambulance. Filing No. 1 at 5. Instead, Peterson took a selfie and left. Filing No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges she is entitled to \$1

billion in damages for the emotional harm done by Peterson's failure to call for medical assistance. Filing No. 1 at 5.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ON INITIAL REVIEW

The Court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.").

"The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved." *Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.*, 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Hopkins v. Saunders*, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)). However, "[a] pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." *Topchian*, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint, keeping in mind that complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). "Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural law." Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984). Additionally, "[t]hough pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced." Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted) see also Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e will not supply additional facts, nor will we construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded"); Cunningham v. Ray, 648 F.2d 1185, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981) ("[P]ro se litigants must set [a claim] forth in a manner which, taking the pleaded facts as true, states a claim as a matter of law."). A complaint must state enough to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

Plaintiff's Complaint, even construed liberally, does not state a claim for relief. First, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is generally set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under these statutes, federal jurisdiction is available only when a "federal question" is presented (i.e., in a civil action arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States) or when the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. Plaintiff

appears to seek damages for emotional distress resulting from Peterson's refusal to call for an ambulance. There is no federal cause of action for such a claim and Plaintiff's allegations—construed liberally—seek damages under state tort law. Moreover, Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Nebraska, so the diversity-of-citizenship requirement is not met for diversity jurisdiction. Thus, Plaintiff has not stated a claim over which the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Further, even if Plaintiff alleges a constitutional claim against the Scottsbluff County Sheriff, "[i]t is well settled that a municipality may not be found liable under § 1983 'unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." *Lee v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist.*, 472 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing the Scottsbluff County Sheriff took action under an official policy that caused a constitutional tort.

Additionally, the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for damages by private parties against a state, state instrumentalities, and an employee of a state sued in the employee's official capacity. See, e.g., Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 47 (8th Cir. 1995). Any award of retroactive monetary relief payable by the state, including for damages, is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment absent a waiver of immunity by the state or an override of immunity by Congress. See, e.g., id.; Nevels v. Hanlon, 656 F.2d 372, 377 78 (8th Cir. 1981). To the extent Plaintiff has sued the State of Nebraska and seeks only monetary relief against the State, the Eleventh Amendment bars this claim.

V. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

There is no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in a civil case. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). A district court "may request an attorney to represent" an indigent civil litigant, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), but it has a "good deal of discretion" in deciding whether to do so, Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898, 909 (8th Cir. 2011). "Relevant criteria for determining whether counsel should be requested include the factual and legal complexity of the case, the plaintiff's ability to investigate the facts and to present the claims, and the presence or absence of conflicting testimony." Recca v. Omaha Police Dep't, 859 Fed. Appx. 3, 4 (8th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (citing Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996)); Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006). Having carefully considered the record, the Court will not appoint counsel at this time.

V. "REQUEST TO TRANSFER ADMISSIONS"

Plaintiff's Motion, captioned as a "Request to Transfer Admissions," is largely indiscernible. Plaintiff submitted the Motion in numerous pending cases before the Court, but fails to specify how it is relevant to the present case. Although the Motion asserts Plaintiff is entitled to "reinstatement," it does not identify the nature of the reinstatement or provide a legal basis for seeking relief. Even construed liberally, the Motion lacks a coherent statement of the relief sought and is therefore denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Complaint does not show this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all of the Defendants, nor does it allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. Thus, no claim is stated upon which relief may be granted. Consequently, Plaintiff's Complaint

is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court on its own motion will give Plaintiff an opportunity to allege sufficient facts to state an actionable claim for relief.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

- 1. Plaintiff shall have 30 days to file an amended complaint in accordance with this Memorandum and Order. Failure to file an amended complaint within the time specified by the Court will result in the Court dismissing this case without further notice to Plaintiff. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must comply with federal pleading requirements.
- 2. In the event Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall restate the relevant allegations of the Complaint, Filing No. 1, and any new allegations. Failure to consolidate all claims into one document may result in the abandonment of claims. Plaintiff is warned that an amended complaint will supersede, not supplement, his prior pleadings.
- The Court reserves the right to conduct further review of Plaintiff's claims in the event she files an amended complaint.
- 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to set a pro se case management deadline using the following text: **January 12, 2024**—amended complaint due.
- 5. Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel, Filing No. 16, is denied.
- Plaintiff's Motion captioned as a "Request for Transfer Admissions," Filing
 No. 17, is denied.

Dated this 12th day of November, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

Joseph F. Bataillon

Senior United States District Judge